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Illustrations

Introduction
Appropriate talent is needed at all levels if distinguished service is to be performed.
Karl von Clausewitz "Force Development will enable us to focus on each individual by emphasizing our common airman culture while offering a variety of choices that respects the distinctive elements of your career field. We plan to add a dimension to your educational experience that has not been fully exploited in our current PME and advanced educational structure. Most importantly, we have made sure that this new emphasis reflects a sincere respect for your time -time that you owe to other priorities in your life, like your families." CSAF Sight Picture 6 Nov 2002
The quote above is taken from the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Sight Picture announcing a new philosophy for the development of the Air Force's number one resource;
people. 1 This paper is will review the Air Force's new Force Development construct as it applies to the officer corps. It will also offer insights on how to ensure it is successful and enduring. The analysis will take place using John P. Kotter's eight steps for leading change. It will review the Force Development construct and analyze it from a frame of reference that considers why transforming organizations fail and what can be done to reduce the risk of failure.
The intent is to identify any shortcomings in the construct, highlight processes requiring change, and assist the Air Force in building the road to a more robust, better educated, and visionary officer corps. To begin the process, it is necessary to first look at the Officer Force Development program as it currently exists and understand where the Air Force is headed in the 21st Century.
There are two major initiatives underway. The first focuses on the educational opportunities afforded to officers. The second is to establish career development teams to guide officer development over the course of a career.
Jump-starting the educational process in 2003, the Air Force will send more than 140 additional officers to the Air Force Institute of Technology, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Joint Military Intelligence College to gain their Intermediate Developmental Education. 2 Also changing is the way the Air Force promotes Advanced Academic Degrees (AAD). No longer will officers be encouraged to get advanced academic degrees that do not benefit them or the Air Force.
The second initiative establishes Development Teams for each career field. The objective of each team is to maximize the potential of each officer and deliver the best return for the Air Force. Representatives from the MAJCOMs and the Air Staff will comprise the teams. Each team will review an officer's credentials at three levels in a career and also review the officer's stated assignment preferences and career goals. At the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, the Development Team will make recommendations to the officer, his supervisor, and AFPC on what assignment best meets the needs of the Air Force and the interests of the officer. This assignment system is not a return to the all-volunteer assignment system of the early 1990s.
However, Force Development is more than assignments and Professional Military
Education. It really focuses on a crucial part of successful senior officers, the development of leadership and management skills. It is important to note that both are necessary in a successful large organization. The term "manager" often evokes a negative response from many senior leaders, perhaps a side effect of the Vietnam era and more recently, the Total Quality Management approach. Management development is more closely related to developing particular skills such as finance, command and control technology, acquisition, and contracting.
There is a distinct difference between management and leadership, but both are needed within Development construct presupposes that officer development in recent years has occurred through chance development, and not a coherent plan. That may be overstating the situation since most officers do take an interest in their careers and attempt to get the best assignments to aid in their development. Perhaps a more accurate statement would be that officer development has functioned under the auspices of chaos theory. Seemingly random events in the early stages of a career have far-reaching effects. The sometimes chance assignment to challenging positions still develops new leaders, although the methodology may not be recognized as a "plan." In either case, the lack of a coherent plan for officer development has perhaps ignored the growth of officers with significant potential, but who are unaware of the opportunities available, and may be overlooked by the "system."
Force Development is not just another assignment system or way to manage PME. It is the first real attempt in many years to link strategic goals of officer development, guided by career
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field experts and doctrine, to the assignment process and educational opportunities. The Air
Force is looking at the skills, assignments, and educational opportunities of current senior leaders. By looking back through time, the Air Force can "illuminate" what paths were most helpful in producing leaders and managers capable of operating at the strategic level. By growing senior officers through better processes, the service gains better leaders at all levels.
Transforming assignments to give individuals more control over their career while meeting the needs of the Air Force through more well-rounded leaders is another way to improve the officer corps. The figure below represents the growth from tactical to strategic leaders.
Force Development
The Construct A series of experiences and challenges, combined with educational and training opportunities that are directed at producing airmen who possess the requisite skills, knowledge, experience and motivation to lead and execute the full spectrum of Air Force missions.
At the tactical level, Force Development is focused on honing followers, motivating subordinates and influencing peers. Officers at this level are learning the culture of the Air Force and internalizing the core values.
At the operational level, Force Development is where officers transition from a tactical specialty to integrating their knowledge into achieving greater team accomplishments. In addition to developing personal leadership, officers will begin to develop institutional leadership abilities.
At the strategic level, officers combine all their previous experiences and education to provide broad leadership. An understanding of interservice, multinational, and interagency relationships is required and is supplemented with the team building and people skills acquired over the course of a career.
Officer development is proceeding through significant change in the selection process and availability of PME, and in the assignment system. Any major change in an organization often has problems. Anguish and wasted effort are usually avoidable by studying how other large organizations have successfully navigated through the change process. There are eight parts of the change process that deserve careful review with the Air Force's new Force Development construct in mind.
Reviewing Force Development Using an Eight Stage Process
The 
Establishing a Sense of Urgency
It is very tough to makes significant changes in a large organization, and tougher still to make those changes stick. Major changes are often associated with a broken process or flawed institution. Establishing a sense of urgency in those cases is clearly needed, but for the USAF, the process under which officers are developed is not broken. In any organization pushing to improve, a great deal of cooperation, initiative, and self-sacrifice will be required. Why then should there be a sense of urgency? The desire is to install a better process, but unless a sense of urgency is established, the inertia of the large bureaucracy will quickly overwhelm change efforts. Kotter claims as many as 15,000 in an organization of 100,000 must go beyond the call of duty to produce significant change. 5 Crucial to creating change are the initial changes and getting leaders at all levels on board with the effort. Critical to getting leadership moving is the need to understand the types of personalities involved. Some personality types are more resistant to the initial stages of change, especially when entrenched in a large bureaucracy.
When things are going well, as they are with the current Officer Assignment and Promotion system, bureaucracies will often have great inertia and resistance to change. A valid question leadership, what may be causing some of the early resistance, and why it is often so difficult to achieve lasting change. Leaders often underestimate how hard it is to make major changes in an organization. Without a sense of urgency, Air Force members, civilian employees, and contracts may not put forth the extra effort required to change something that is apparently working fine.
Getting that many officers out of their comfort zone and into the realm of real change requires that Air Force leaders demand changes be made soon. The push to begin curriculum changes at Air Command and Staff College, and to increase the number of majors attending Intermediate Development Education (IDE) early in the process is a good example of establishing a sense of urgency. Under orders to make changes for the 2004 academic year, the personnel system, from the 3-star at the top, to the assignment officers at the Air Force Personnel Center, had to respond.
There was little time to sit back, study the issue, and let the normal bureaucratic process stretch on for months or years. PME and assignment policies, curricula changes, and facilities plans
were just a few of the "deliverables" the Chief of Staff expected to see and approve to accomplish the first major milestone. There was almost certainly some complaining about the hard push, but low and behold, the Air Force has a changed curriculum at Air Command and Staff College, and increased numbers attending the Air Force Institute of Technology for IDE Masters' Degrees. It is, however, important to note that not all officers are affected by these early changes and do not feel any real sense of urgency. Discussions with young officers attending Squadron Officers' School reveal their supervisors are still advising them to seek a master's degree. Many of today's squadron commanders still recall the masking and unmasking of advanced academic degrees in the early 1990s. As such, there appears to be huge skepticism among officers in the field. Kotter offers ways to raise the urgency level across the entire organization. One method in particular is open and honest discussions of problems with the current way of doing business. 8 The Air Force should consider moving away from, "everything is fine, but we need to change" to "let me give you some specific examples of what is wrong with the way we currently train and assign our officers." Once the officers, and especially those recalcitrant supervisors, are aware of why change is needed, they will be far more likely to acquire their own sense of urgency.
Creating a Guiding Coalition
Lasting, major change in an organization and bureaucracy as large as the Air Force requires a powerful force to sustain the process. A single individual at the top may create the vision, but cannot fully develop it, consider the ramifications and unintended consequences, and communicate it. 9 The comeback of Chrysler in the 1980s is associated with Lee Iacocca and the renewal of IBM brings to mind the efforts of Lou Gerstner. However, the CEO, or in this case would seem to meet the above criteria. However, some negative feedback from older company grade and younger field officers is present 11 , with the gist of the complaint being that general officers are too far removed from today's young officers to understand how they see their careers or family life. That is not a new problem. In every discussion of assignments or PME, there has always been the belief by the younger officers that the preceding generation is out of touch with their desires. Is this the beginning of a significant problem or just old wine in new skins?
Although generational differences can be found all the way back to earliest military records, it may also be the first indications of true dissatisfaction among young officers.
Developing Vision and Strategy
What is vision? It is not predicting the future, but rather constructing the future you want. Leaders wishing to transform an organization do not just think up a vision and sell it to the followers. A vision must take into account cause and effect to reach the desired future. 12 When asked about great transformations, most people will associate a single person at the top of the organization with the big changes. Certainly, that was the case of the USAF's Objective Wing Structure as it was envisioned and enacted by former CSAF General Merrill McPeak. That structure has been "tweaked" in recent years, but the basic structure is still in place. Why is vision so important? It serves three purposes in the case of Force Development. First, by describing the vision of a changed assignment process and developmental education, the Air Force leadership has defined the direction for change. Second, it has motivated other senior leaders to take action in the right direction to transform processes to reach the desired end state.
Third, a communicated vision helps coordinate the actions of many different organizations within the Air Force.
A key aspect of the vision of Force Development is the drive to create a much larger group of great officers and leaders. The Air Force has aimed too low, for too long, in its leadership development activities. Michangelo said, "The greatest danger for most of us is not that our aim is too high and we miss it, but that is too low and we reach it." 13 In the past, the Air Force, has created a few outstanding leaders, and underdeveloped a large portion of the rest of the officer corps. Crucial to developing great leaders of the past and present was providing the best and brightest the opportunity to observe senior leaders in action. When asked how to develop decision makers, General Eisenhower replied, "Be around people making decisions. Those officers who achieved the top positions of leadership were around decision makers, who served as their mentors." 14 That style of leadership development is not wrong and produced some outstanding leaders for all branches of the military over the past 50 years. Unfortunately, it is a narrowly focused approach that fails to provide for the development of the broad base of officers supporting the great leaders. The vision of Force Development must supplant the old notions of officer development. It must create a culture where leaders, and followers, of the 21st century can thrive on a broad education, devotion to long-term growth, a commitment to excellence, and a willingness to take risks.
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Communicating the Change Vision
Once a vision is established, it is useless unless leadership finds a way to communicate it down through the entire organization. Leaders must manage the dream. 16 Creating a shared sense of a desirable goal is crucial to sustaining Force Development efforts. •Simplicity: Minimize jargon and do not assume that all officers understand assignments and developmental education •Metaphor, analogy, and example: Anecdotes on why the Air Force needs Force Development are great way to tell the story •Multiple Forums: Keep up the effort already underway. Remember that many younger officers gather tremendous amounts of information via email and the internet •Repetition: It is well proven that most people do not fully understand ideas until they have heard it many times.
•Give-and-take: A single spread-the-word briefing will not suffice. Get out to the field multiple times as the process develops to answer questions. Two-way communication is always more powerful than one-way communication.
•Explain Inconsistencies: Problems or efforts that unintended consequences must be addressed.
Failure to do so will undermine credibility. there is, for the first time, going to be a module specifically dedicated to follow-on jobs.
Providing necessary training to ensure the "right person at the right place" will put officers into effective roles much sooner after graduating from IDE. Other broad-based action includes the creation of the Force Development teams to guide career paths and provide strategic direction to AFPC on assignment policies. Unfortunately, the word "empowerment" can bring out some rather disapproving frowns since many officers were disaffected of the Total Quality Management programs of the past. That bias can become an obstacle, so it is important that the focus be on getting the job done with all necessary support from above, not just the wording of the process. Another important part of making sure that people have the power to make changes is to ensure that supervisors and commanders who attempt to undercut the Force Development program are confronted and removed if necessary. Nothing discourages people about a major change more than a boss who makes disparaging remarks or openly defies the new program.
Generating Short-Term Wins
Whenever major transformation is underway, short-term wins provide visible evidence of good things happening during the change. Personnel can see for themselves how Force Development is improving the way officers are grown. Short-term wins also must be unambiguous. There can be no doubt about what caused the win and why. In a similar vein, short-term wins must be clearly related to Force Development. 18 The figure below shows the role of short-term wins and the effects on the Air Force.
•Provide evidence that sacrifices are worth it: The 50% increase in IDE helps justify the long hours necessary to adapt the process.
•Help fine-tune vision and strategies: The urgency to change IDE will clarify the way ahead for changes in SDE.
•Undermine cynics: Publicizing the wins helps eliminate people who are blocking the way by removing the argument of "it's too big a change, they can never made it work." •Build momentum: As personnel see good changes and improvements, the desire to become a part of successful change becomes greater. officer had already completed a joint tour and had commanded a squadron twice. 19 The inputs from the Developmental Team are too generic, lack a focused direction, and do not seem to make best use of the officer's background. Without meaningful guidance from the Developmental Team, the assignment officer is left to match an assignment based on business as usual.
Unfortunately, this type of story seems to make its way around the "grapevine" very quickly and can negate the positive effects of short-term wins. Careful review of what inputs are provided from the Developmental Teams is necessary to turn "business as usual" into a "that really makes sense for me" situation that would reflect positively on the Air Force.
Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change
Major change takes a long time, especially in an organization as large as the Air Force.
There are several forces that can stall the process. New personnel in key positions and significant turnover of action officers on the Air Staff and at AFPC can create obstacles in the process. Resistance to change is always ready to reassert itself and tear down many of the new programs begun under Force Development. 20 Distractions, such as a major crisis or significant events involving large portions of the Air Force, are also forms of resistance, although they are rarely recognized as such at the time. Major combat or humanitarian operations, especially those overseas, divert attention from efforts to make further changes. Certainly, support of combat, humanitarian, or relief operations takes priority, but a cardinal rule of transformation according to Kotter is "Whenever you let up before the job is done, critical momentum can be lost and regression may follow." The decision to delay changes to SDE until the new Leadership doctrine is ready may be a clear case of letting up before the job is done. Although the doctrine is moving along rapidly, any unexpected delays may very well cascade downward and cause an updated SDE curriculum to slip another academic year. A continued focus by senior leadership is required to maintain clarity on the overall effort and keep the urgency level high.
Anchoring the Change in the Culture
Most scholars agree that leaders are made, not born. However, some scholars also believe that adults learn best when they take charge of their own learning. A crucial piece of the transformation process is to align structures with the vision.
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There are two major processes the Air Force must change to align structures with the new vision of Officer Development. They are the Officer Evaluation System and the Officer Promotion System. They are barriers associated with a longstanding culture of "firewalling" reports on officers. They will be extremely difficult to change, but they must evolve to ensure that the "right person" is chosen to advance, to command, and ultimately to lead at the highest levels.
Chapter 3
Future Issues Officer Performance Review Changes
Kotter states that personnel systems and structures not aligned with the vision will block needed action. 23 Stated another way, aligning personnel system structures to the vision opens the door for further clarity in officer development, and goes a long ways toward anchoring the change in the culture of the Air Force. It can be argued that the current Officer Performance
Reports do not support the Force Development construct. They are little more than writing exercises to see which rater can create a word picture of glowing comments. There is little stratification and officers rarely receive any meaningful feedback on whether they have the potential to become commanders or senior leaders. Air Force Officer Performance Reports have the long-standing issue of inflated reports and no clear indication of command potential. 24 Discussions with students at Squadron Officer School reveal a lack on confidence in the evaluation system to provide a meaningful report on their performance and potential.
Across the Air Force, there are some officers who have received meaningful, realistic feedback and mentoring, but there are others who say they never knew they were not 'in the running" for command. Indeed, the first time they realized something was amiss in their career progression or potential was when they were passed over for promotion. With the tremendous numbers of company grade officers in the service right now, the Air Force owes it to them to establish a performance evaluation system that is meaningful and has some means of controlling Block 40 provides the rater a chance to provide a next job recommendation.
Figure 5 Navy Office Performance Report Excerpt
This is the first chance for the ratee to realize that he or she may not be on track for command if the job recommendation is not one that supports a command or senior leadership track. The Navy tracks the average rating given by its leaders and can provide meaningful back to command selection or promotion boards if an officer's ratings are above or below the average due to the rater being too "soft" or too "hard." The Navy also has members sign the report prior to its submission through personnel channels. 27 To open the Pandora's Box of officer evaluations is an undertaking of tremendous import and will require a level of effort approaching, or possibly exceeding that of Force Development. However, to provide the best opportunity for officer development and grow future leaders and managers, the Air Force must change the existing system and do so sooner rather than later. Providing honest feedback and building trust in the system through a fair and uninflated performance report is a powerful way to identify the strengths and weaknesses of officers. By doing so, the Air Force gives officers the opportunity to develop the strengths and mitigate the shortcomings in their leadership styles.
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Many young officers truly want to learn about their faults and strengths and what can be done to improve their performance. They dream of becoming great leaders, but too often are not aware of how they compare to their peers and are at a loss on how to begin the road to extraordinary leadership. In his book, On Leadership, John Gardner talks about leadership development being a lifelong growth process. It requires repeated opportunities for challenge as well as education. 29 In addition to providing feedback to the officer, a changed evaluation process will assist in the promotion process.
Promotion System Changes
If the goal of the Air Force is to provide maximum growth for all officers, it may need to rethink the timelines commonly accepted for selection to senior officer leadership positions, and possibly that for promotion to brigadier general. The figure below depicts a notional career path using the timeline commonly seen for progression to group and wing command. Similarly, the figure depicts group command beginning around the 20-year point. At present, officers who reach the rank of colonel in due course are in the zone for promotion at the 21-year point. Realizing this is a notional, generic career path, one would expect to see some deviation from the "due course," but at present, it seems to support the notion that BTZ is necessary to achieve senior leadership positions. However, the generic career path depicted does support the timeline necessary to become a general officer. At present, the 24-year point is the "heart of the envelope" for selection to brigadier general in the Air Force. 30 With early promotion to major no longer possible, the Air Force may be setting a timeline that is unrealistic. By expecting its top leaders to not only achieve promotion BTZ at both the lieutenant colonel and colonel boards and accomplish necessary career broadening duties and a joint tour, the Air Force may very well find itself with a "bow wave" of officers reaching the 24-year point that lack the desired skills.
Development Path
Conversely, those who seem to have a diverse background at the 24-year point may suffer from "touch and go" assignments that failed to provide true development.
Another issue for future promotion boards is when to unmask advanced academic degrees.
Under current plans, advanced academic degrees will be masked at promotion boards, possibly until the colonel board. This presents two significant issues for current and future promotion boards. First, given the existing OPR system, what methodology will promotion boards use to "draw the line" on who will and will not be promoted? The masking of advanced academic degrees was done in the past, but always resurfaced as a means of delineating between officers in the middle of the pack. The officers at the top and the bottom of the pile are easy to pick out.
Unfortunately, there is often difficulty identifying the right place to draw the promotion cutoff line. Although getting an advanced academic degree unrelated to a career field is not optimum, it should also be noted that acquiring new knowledge is never a waste. Research indicates that any challenging mental activity develops new neural networks in the brain, thereby increasing overall intelligence.
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Second, should the Air Force chose to unmask advanced academic degrees at the colonel board, there is a side effect of Force Development that must be considered. The Air Force stated that if it wants an officer to have an advanced academic degree, it will pay for it and provide the time necessary to obtain it. Even with the projected increases in PME opportunities, not everyone will have a chance to attend. Consider the following scenario. Someone who is a major now and is not chosen to attend IDE will not likely get the chance to attend SDE either.
Essentially, the Air Force has told the officer, "You do not need an advanced academic degree."
The officer is then selected for lieutenant colonel without an advanced academic degree, has good OPRs, developmental assignments, and is possibly even a squadron commander.
Therefore, the officer is comfortable with a reasonable chance for promotion to Colonel. At this point, his Officer Selection Brief (OSB) now shows up at the promotion board without an advanced academic degree for the first time in his career. This tells the promotion board that the Air Force did not believe the officer had sufficient potential to warrant attending PME. Unless a Definitely Promote is given by the Senior Rater, the officer is likely to be passed over for promotion. As officers realize this pitfall exists, they will feel obliged to get an advanced academic degree on their own as hedge against not attending IDE or SDE. This puts the Air Promote or Early Promote rankings based on the number of officers of the same rank that the senior rater is evaluating. 32 There is no separate PRF provided and the promotion board uses the current and previous report recommendations to build a picture of the officer and decide on potential for advancement to higher rank. In the event that a particular rater is unusually harsh or lenient, the Navy provides information to the promotion board about the senior rater to normalize the rankings against other officers. A system such as this will also help provide a better force in the long run by requiring an officer to have sustained performance to be most eligible for promotion. Long-term effort, steadfastness and, a genuine desire to improve the Air Force would hold more sway in promotions than a sudden burst of effort as promotion time nears.
Figure 7 Navy Promotion Recommendation
Kotter provides a great example of resistance to change caused by people doing business in the same old way. A company had taken great care to implement the change using Kotter's eight steps, but there was still resistance. Drilling down into the issue, it was discovered that the personnel structures used for evaluations and promotions were never changed to match the vision. 33 Without significant change to both the Officer Evaluation and Promotion Systems, Air
Force officers will tend to cling to the old ways of doing business to remain competitive for promotion and to ensure their subordinates are best positioned should the latest changes be reversed under a new Chief of Staff.
Chapter 4 Conclusion
Major change is a complicated process that can take years to fully implement in a large organization. The Air Force's new Force Development construct as it applies to the officer corps is certainly part of a complex process with complicated structures. The changes implemented in officer development are the first steps in improving the long-term professionalism, knowledge, and leadership of the Air Force. However, bureaucratic organizations tend to be resistant to change and care must be taken to ensure success of change initiatives.
To quickly review, there are two major initiatives underway to change the way the officer corps is developed. The first focuses on the educational opportunities afforded to officers through increased changes for professional military education and advanced academic degrees.
The second is to establish career development teams to guide officer development over the course of a career. By understanding and reviewing Force Development changes as applied using John Kotter's eight steps to leading change, the Air Force can improve its opportunity to affect a meaningful and long-lasting improvement in the officer corps.
First, establish a sense of urgency by explaining the pitfalls of the current process and ensure that officers at all levels understand. Current anecdotal evidence indicates that many mid-level company grade officers are apathetic to the changes. Second, create a guiding coalition of well-qualified, highly credible leaders who are in touch with younger officers.
Strive to know what they feel is necessary for their growth and quality of life. Third, develop a vision and strategy that recognizes that not everyone will reach the rank of general officer. No longer should the focus be developing a few great leaders, but rather the goal must be to lift the entire officer corps to a new level of education, development, and excellence. Fourth, communicate the change vision to all levels. The message must be communicated, by various media. The key to reaching and imbuing this change in the officer corps is to repeat, repeat, repeat the message and make sure the supervisors are presenting the message as it was intended. grasp what has happened so far and be prepared to take officer development to the next level.
Last, but certainly not least, is the eighth step. Anchor the change in the culture to build for long-term success. An entire generation of officers must grow under the new system before it truly becomes a part of the culture. In addition, the Air Force must align its personnel structures to the vision.
Both officer evaluation and promotion processes need an extensive overhaul. Inflation of reports with no meaningful feedback on next assignment or leadership potential can easily hamstring the desire to provide the right person at the right place at the right time. Likewise, the promotion system, with years of on-again, off-again masking of advanced academic degrees is viewed as suspect by officers from colonel down to lieutenant. There is no doubt that these are monumental undertakings, but both are necessary to anchor the changes in the culture.
This paper has covered a broad canvas of issues surrounding officer development, but it has done so in an attempt to lay a strong foundation for the biggest changes to United States Air Force officer to occur in decades, and ensure its enduring success.
